Tuesday, November 20, 2007

Financial Times: America loses faith in imperialism

Posted on MSN Money

Well, that was quick. In 2003, the idea of empire became fashionable in Washington, DC. But the flirtation has lasted little more than three years. The imperial eagles are being put back in the cupboard. The challenge for the US now will be to avoid sliding straight from imperialism to isolationism.

It is true that President George W. Bush always insisted that the US had no imperial ambitions. But - as ever - his vice-president had his own agenda. In 2003, just after the invasion of Iraq, the Christmas card that Dick Cheney sent to his friends read: "And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without His notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without His aid?"

Many American conservatives were considerably less coy. Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations wrote an article frankly entitled: "The Case for American Empire". Charles Krauthammer, an influential columnist, panted that America "is the dominant power in the world, more dominant than any since Rome. America is in a position to ... create new realities." Mr Krauthammer recommended that this be done by "unapologetic and implacable demonstrations of will". In two influential books, Niall Ferguson, a British historian and FT contributing editor, sought to rehabilitate the reputation of the British empire and to suggest that liberal US imperialism "makes sense today in terms of both American self-interest and altruism".

Imperial analogies still fascinate America. But the latest American books on empire are markedly less optimistic than the ones appearing a couple of years ago. Cullen Murphy's Are We Rome? - which made the best-seller lists this year - argues that the US is in danger of emulating Rome's decline and fall by succumbing to Roman-style corruption and arrogance. America needs to rediscover its civic virtues.

Amy Chua's just-published Day of Empire also strikes a warning note. It argues that "hyper-powers" (a term she prefers to "empire") have always been tolerant and open. Ms Chua thinks the biggest danger to American power is if the US slips into intolerance and xenophobia - bashing immigrants and embracing militarism. America can remain "the world's hyper-power in decades to come". But only, she thinks, if it chooses to base its power on "opportunity, dynamism and moral force".

It seems to be all but obligatory to end books on America's role in the world on a note of sugary optimism. (Cullen Murphy declares that the way to avoid Roman-style decline is clear: "The antidote is being American.") Nonetheless, the intellectual climate has obviously changed. The triumph of the will foretold by Mr Krauthammer has not materialised in Iraq or Afghanistan. American intellectuals are losing faith in the allure and possibility of empire. The question is: what next?

The conservatives who embraced the word "empire" a few years ago were being deliberately provocative. If America was indeed in something like an "imperial" mood in 2003, it simply meant the US was determined to use its economic and military pre-eminence to change the world. If that involved invading, occupying and reshaping whole countries, so be it.

Four years on, "imperialism" looks a lot harder and less attractive. America's generals fret publicly that their formidable military machine could be "broken" in Iraq. The fiscal deficit is mounting and the dollar is falling.

This new pessimism is unlikely to lead to a rush to leave Iraq. But it does mean that the US will be very reluctant to undertake further "imperial" ventures around the world.

Of course, America went through a similar period of introversion after the Vietnam war. It did not last long. The difference is that in the post-Vietnam era the only potential rival for the role of global imperial power - the Soviet Union - was (we see in retrospect) in terminal decline. This time round there are new, rising powers that seem considerably more dynamic than was the USSR.

As America threatens to slide into recession, China is still growing at 10 per cent a year. Four of the world's 10 largest companies by market capitalisation are now Chinese. But the Chinese economy is unlikely to overtake that of the US for a generation or more. China also faces a host of well-known domestic problems and the country's leaders show little sign of developing a truly global foreign policy. Other potential imperiums are even less convincing. India is still a regional power. The European Union lacks military muscle and struggles to speak with one voice.

Some worry that a world without a dominant "imperial" power will be more dangerous. Who will ensure order? Who will keep the shipping lanes open and set the rules for the global financial system? The idea that all these things will be peacefully settled at the United Nations does not seem realistic.

But there is one cause for optimism. Despite Iraq, it may in fact suit the rising powers tacitly to accept US leadership for some time to come. That is because the new rising powers have a direct stake in the smooth functioning of the current international system.

Previous empires have gained power and wealth by conquering territory. But China, India and even a resurgent Russia are emulating America by trading their way to greatness. Their ruling elites are directly enriched by globalisation. They also know that - despite Iraq - America still has the largest economy and the most powerful military in the world. The US may have gone off the idea of acting as the new Rome. But the barbarians are still a long way from the Beltway.

gideon.rachman@ft.com

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Copyright 2007 Financial Times

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