Peter Coy, Michelle Conlin and Moira Hervst write on Businessweek about how the use of temporary workers in the U.S. has increased and about how worker tenure is eroding, and on the effects it has on the workforce. The first page:
On a recent Tuesday morning, single mom Tammy DePew Smith woke up in her tidy Florida townhouse in time to shuttle her oldest daughter, a high school freshman, to the 6:11 a.m. bus. At 6:40 she was at the desk in her bedroom, starting her first shift of the day with LiveOps, a Santa Clara (Calif.) provider of call-center workers for everyone from Eastman Kodak (EK) and Pizza Hut (YUM) to infomercial behemoth Tristar Products. She's paid by the minute—25 cents—but only for the time she's actually on the phone with customers.
By 7:40, Smith had grossed $15. But there wasn't much time to reflect on her early morning productivity; the next child had to be roused from bed, fed, and put onto the school bus. Somehow she managed to squeeze three more shifts into her day, pausing only to homeschool her 7-year-old son, make dinner, and do the bedtime routine. "I tell my kids, unless somebody is bleeding or dying, don't mess with me."
As an independent agent, Smith has no health insurance, no retirement benefits, no sick days, no vacation, no severance, and no access to unemployment insurance. But in recession-ravaged Ormond Beach, she's considered lucky. She has had more or less steady work since she signed on with LiveOps in October 2006. "LiveOps was a lifesaver for me," she says.
You know American workers are in bad shape when a low-paying, no-benefits job is considered a sweet deal. Their situation isn't likely to improve soon; some economists predict it will be years, not months, before employees regain any semblance of bargaining power. That's because this recession's unusual ferocity has accelerated trends—including offshoring, automation, the decline of labor unions' influence, new management techniques, and regulatory changes—that already had been eroding workers' economic standing.
The forecast for the next five to 10 years: more of the same, with paltry pay gains, worsening working conditions, and little job security. Right on up to the C-suite, more jobs will be freelance and temporary, and even seemingly permanent positions will be at greater risk. "When I hear people talk about temp vs. permanent jobs, I laugh," says Barry Asin, chief analyst at the Los Altos (Calif.) labor-analysis firm Staffing Industry Analysts. "The idea that any job is permanent has been well proven not to be true." As Kelly Services (KELYA) CEO Carl Camden puts it: "We're all temps now."
Peter Cappelli, director of the Center for Human Resources at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School, says the brutal recession has prompted more companies to create just-in-time labor forces that can be turned on and off like a spigot. "Employers are trying to get rid of all fixed costs," Cappelli says. "First they did it with employment benefits. Now they're doing it with the jobs themselves. Everything is variable." That means companies hold all the power, and "all the risks are pushed on to employees."
The era of the disposable worker has big implications both for employees and employers. For workers, research shows that chronic unemployment and underemployment cause lasting damage: Older people who lose jobs are often forced into premature retirement, while the careers of younger people are stunted by their early detachment from the working world. Even 15 years out of school, people who graduated from college in a recession earn 2.5% less than if they had graduated in more prosperous times, research has shown.
Diminishing job security is also widening the gap between the highest- and lowest-paid workers. At the top, people with sought-after skills can earn more by jumping from assignment to assignment than they can by sticking with one company. But for the least educated, who have no special skills to sell, the new deal for labor offers nothing but downside.
Employers prize flexibility, of course. But if they aren't careful they can wind up with an alienated, dispirited workforce. A Conference Board survey released on Jan. 5 found that only 45% of workers surveyed were satisfied with their jobs, the lowest in 22 years of polling. Poor morale can devastate performance. After making deep staff cuts following the subprime implosion, UBS (UBS), Credit Suisse (CS), and American Express (AXP) hired Harvard psychology lecturer Shawn Achor to train their remaining employees in positive thinking. Says Achor: "All the employees had just stopped working."
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
NY Times: Of individual liberty and cap and trade
Robert Frank, an economist, argues in a NY Times editorial that cap and trade is consistent with market-based thinking and is likely the most economically efficient way to reduce carbon emissions:
SOME people oppose measures to limit greenhouse gases because they believe that global warming is a myth. These denialists may have a little extra spring in their step during the current cold snap, but their influence has been steadily waning.
The biggest remaining obstacle is disagreement over the legitimacy of proposed solutions. At the heart of attempts to curb carbon dioxide emissions are two related proposals: taxation of those emissions and a system of tradable emission permits, also known as cap and trade. Both have been attacked as unacceptable restrictions on individual liberty. The attacks have come from both sides of the political aisle, but have been pressed with particular insistence by conservatives and libertarians.
It’s a puzzling objection, because both proposals are squarely consistent with the framework advocated by conservatives’ patron saint regarding matters related to private actions that harm others. That would be Ronald H. Coase, professor emeritus at the University of Chicago and the 1991 Nobel laureate in economics, who will turn 100 this year.
Mr. Coase (the name rhymes with “dose”) summarized his framework in a 1960 paper titled “The Problem of Social Cost,” which has become one of the most-often-cited economics papers ever published. He stressed that actions with harmful side effects — negative externalities, in economists’ parlance — are quintessentially practical problems. They are best solved, he argued, not by chanting slogans about rights and freedoms, but by steering mitigation efforts to those who can perform them most efficiently.
The pre-Coase tradition was to view externalities in terms of perpetrators and victims. The owner of a factory that emitted smoke was a perpetrator, for example, and those who were harmed by it were victims. The conventional view was that perpetrators should be restrained from harming victims.
Mr. Coase’s profound insight was that this view ignored the inherently reciprocal nature of externalities. Smoke harms others, yes. But preventing smoke causes harm, too, because smokestack filters are costly. Our shared interest, he reasoned, was to use the least costly means of reducing the relevant damage.
In some cases, that might involve filtering out much of the smoke. But in others, the cheapest solution might be for parties downwind to relocate. Mr. Coase argued that whenever it was practical for affected parties to forge private agreements among themselves, they would have strong incentive to use the least costly solution to the problem.
His paper provoked a firestorm of criticism, based on the impression that he was claiming that government didn’t need to regulate activities that cause harm to others. As a closer reading makes clear, however, this could not have been his view, especially with respect to activities like global pollution.
Some pollution damage is localized. But when it comes to global warming, people cannot escape damage by simply moving upwind. Because of the wide variety of activities involved and the large number of people affected, there is no practical way to negotiate private solutions. In such cases, Mr. Coase suggested, government regulators should try to mimic solutions that people would have adopted on their own if negotiations had been practical.
Climate scientists agree that the cheapest way to combat global warming is to curb carbon dioxide emissions. And economists agree that the cheapest way to do that is by changing emitters’ incentives, either by taxing emissions or requiring emission permits.
I chatted with Mr. Coase briefly last week, and he is still following these issues. He agreed that both taxes and tradable permits satisfy his criterion of concentrating damage abatement with those who can accomplish it at least cost. Those with inexpensive ways of reducing emissions will find it attractive to adopt them, thus avoiding carbon dioxide taxes or the need to purchase costly permits. Others will find it cheaper to pay taxes or buy permits.
Although both proposals pass muster within the Coase framework, conservatives remain almost unanimously opposed to the cap-and-trade proposal approved last year in the House and currently under discussion in the Senate. Much of this opposition is rooted in a passionate distaste for “social engineering,” which, according to the conservative columnist Henry Lamb, “always ends in disaster.”
But social engineering is just another term for collective action to change individual incentives. And unconditional rejection of such action is flatly inconsistent with the Coase framework that conservatives have justifiably celebrated.
According to Conservapedia.com, an online encyclopedia with a conservative orientation, Mr. Coase’s “extraordinary insight was that the free market always reaches the most efficient level of productive activity, in the absence of transaction costs.” Maybe, but as Mr. Coase himself also recognized, transaction costs are often prohibitive, and in such cases all bets regarding free-market efficiency are off. When negotiation is impractical, collective action can often improve matters.
In the case of global warming, markets fail because we don’t take into account the costs that our carbon dioxide emissions impose on others. The least intrusive way to have us weigh those costs is by taxing emissions, or by requiring tradable emissions permits. Either step would move us closer to the conservative/libertarian gold standard — namely, the outcome we’d see if there were perfect information and no obstacles to free exchange.
The Conservapedia.com entry on Mr. Coase continues, “To this day, liberals fail to give him the recognition he earned.” A fair point, perhaps. But while Mr. Coase has often been skeptical of government intervention, he is no ideologue. Conservatives, too, have sold him short.
Robert H. Frank is an economics professor at the Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University.
SOME people oppose measures to limit greenhouse gases because they believe that global warming is a myth. These denialists may have a little extra spring in their step during the current cold snap, but their influence has been steadily waning.
The biggest remaining obstacle is disagreement over the legitimacy of proposed solutions. At the heart of attempts to curb carbon dioxide emissions are two related proposals: taxation of those emissions and a system of tradable emission permits, also known as cap and trade. Both have been attacked as unacceptable restrictions on individual liberty. The attacks have come from both sides of the political aisle, but have been pressed with particular insistence by conservatives and libertarians.
It’s a puzzling objection, because both proposals are squarely consistent with the framework advocated by conservatives’ patron saint regarding matters related to private actions that harm others. That would be Ronald H. Coase, professor emeritus at the University of Chicago and the 1991 Nobel laureate in economics, who will turn 100 this year.
Mr. Coase (the name rhymes with “dose”) summarized his framework in a 1960 paper titled “The Problem of Social Cost,” which has become one of the most-often-cited economics papers ever published. He stressed that actions with harmful side effects — negative externalities, in economists’ parlance — are quintessentially practical problems. They are best solved, he argued, not by chanting slogans about rights and freedoms, but by steering mitigation efforts to those who can perform them most efficiently.
The pre-Coase tradition was to view externalities in terms of perpetrators and victims. The owner of a factory that emitted smoke was a perpetrator, for example, and those who were harmed by it were victims. The conventional view was that perpetrators should be restrained from harming victims.
Mr. Coase’s profound insight was that this view ignored the inherently reciprocal nature of externalities. Smoke harms others, yes. But preventing smoke causes harm, too, because smokestack filters are costly. Our shared interest, he reasoned, was to use the least costly means of reducing the relevant damage.
In some cases, that might involve filtering out much of the smoke. But in others, the cheapest solution might be for parties downwind to relocate. Mr. Coase argued that whenever it was practical for affected parties to forge private agreements among themselves, they would have strong incentive to use the least costly solution to the problem.
His paper provoked a firestorm of criticism, based on the impression that he was claiming that government didn’t need to regulate activities that cause harm to others. As a closer reading makes clear, however, this could not have been his view, especially with respect to activities like global pollution.
Some pollution damage is localized. But when it comes to global warming, people cannot escape damage by simply moving upwind. Because of the wide variety of activities involved and the large number of people affected, there is no practical way to negotiate private solutions. In such cases, Mr. Coase suggested, government regulators should try to mimic solutions that people would have adopted on their own if negotiations had been practical.
Climate scientists agree that the cheapest way to combat global warming is to curb carbon dioxide emissions. And economists agree that the cheapest way to do that is by changing emitters’ incentives, either by taxing emissions or requiring emission permits.
I chatted with Mr. Coase briefly last week, and he is still following these issues. He agreed that both taxes and tradable permits satisfy his criterion of concentrating damage abatement with those who can accomplish it at least cost. Those with inexpensive ways of reducing emissions will find it attractive to adopt them, thus avoiding carbon dioxide taxes or the need to purchase costly permits. Others will find it cheaper to pay taxes or buy permits.
Although both proposals pass muster within the Coase framework, conservatives remain almost unanimously opposed to the cap-and-trade proposal approved last year in the House and currently under discussion in the Senate. Much of this opposition is rooted in a passionate distaste for “social engineering,” which, according to the conservative columnist Henry Lamb, “always ends in disaster.”
But social engineering is just another term for collective action to change individual incentives. And unconditional rejection of such action is flatly inconsistent with the Coase framework that conservatives have justifiably celebrated.
According to Conservapedia.com, an online encyclopedia with a conservative orientation, Mr. Coase’s “extraordinary insight was that the free market always reaches the most efficient level of productive activity, in the absence of transaction costs.” Maybe, but as Mr. Coase himself also recognized, transaction costs are often prohibitive, and in such cases all bets regarding free-market efficiency are off. When negotiation is impractical, collective action can often improve matters.
In the case of global warming, markets fail because we don’t take into account the costs that our carbon dioxide emissions impose on others. The least intrusive way to have us weigh those costs is by taxing emissions, or by requiring tradable emissions permits. Either step would move us closer to the conservative/libertarian gold standard — namely, the outcome we’d see if there were perfect information and no obstacles to free exchange.
The Conservapedia.com entry on Mr. Coase continues, “To this day, liberals fail to give him the recognition he earned.” A fair point, perhaps. But while Mr. Coase has often been skeptical of government intervention, he is no ideologue. Conservatives, too, have sold him short.
Robert H. Frank is an economics professor at the Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University.
Businessweek: Finding a Better Lifeline for Homeowners
John Gittleson and Prashant Gophal have an article Businessweek on how some banks are coming around to the idea of reducing the principal on distressed mortgages, instead of just offering the homeowners temporary solutions like cutting interest rates:
Despite encouragement from policymakers, many banks have moved slowly to aid distressed homeowners. When they do modify mortgages, the fixes—such as interest-rate cuts—often are temporary and only put off the day of reckoning.
With another wave of foreclosures looming as payments on risky loans rise and unemployment remains high, it looks as if banks may be forced to resort to a remedy they've been trying to avoid: principal reductions. Banks don't like principal reductions for obvious reasons. But many economists, policymakers, and homeowners see it another way. While interest-rate reductions or extending loan terms do reduce homeowners' monthly payments, they don't give much comfort to borrowers who owe more on their homes than their properties are worth. Borrowers who don't have a stake in their homes are more likely to hand over the keys when they run into trouble. "The evidence is irrefutable," Laurie Goodman, senior managing director of Amherst Securities Group in New York, testified before the U.S. House Financial Services Committee on Dec. 8. "Negative equity is the most important predictor of default."
The 25% plunge in residential real estate prices from their 2006 peak has left homeowners underwater by $745 billion, according to research firm First American CoreLogic—a number that tops the government's $700 billion bailout for banks. That's why Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair is considering incentives for lenders to cut the principal on as much as $45 billion of mortgages acquired from seized banks. "We're looking now at whether we should provide some further loss-sharing for principal writedowns," says Bair.
The foreclosure crisis is likely to deepen this year in part because payments on many adjustable-rate mortgages are set to balloon. Unless there's a sharp recovery in property values or a change in lenders' willingness to cut principal, at least 7 million borrowers currently behind on their payments will lose their homes, estimates Goodman.
RIGHT-SIZING MORTGAGES
Some lenders may be coming around, grudgingly, to the idea of principal reduction. "If you can right-size the mortgage and return to an equity situation, the incentive is to stay," says Micah Green, an attorney at Patton Boggs in Washington, D.C., and a lobbyist for a coalition of mortgage bond investors. Banks can either forgive principal outright or defer it. In deferrals the borrower must pay back the full amount on the original mortgage when he sells the property; if the ultimate sales price doesn't cover the principal, the homeowner has to pay the difference, making it a less effective tool.
A principal deferral helped Marcus Beckett stave off foreclosure. The 42-year-old small-business owner couldn't afford his $2,413 monthly mortgage bill after his income dropped and his son, Riley, was born. In October, OneWest Bank agreed to defer $66,000 of the $423,000 debt on his two-bedroom condominium, which he'll have to pay back if he sells his Aliso Viejo (Calif.) home. The monthly tab on the house he bought in 2006 is now $1,314. "It's like I got a second chance on life," Beckett says. "I feel, mentally, I'm able to keep making payments."
While principal reductions remain rare, banks are doing them more often. In the third quarter of 2009, some 21,000 home loans—3% of the total modified mortgages—included a principal reduction or deferral, according to Mortgage Metrics, a government publication. That's up from 6,245 in the first quarter of 2009, the first time the U.S. reported the data.
Banks that negotiate principal reductions have seen positive results. Last year, Wells Fargo (WFC) cut $2 billion of principal on delinquent loans. After the modifications, the six-month re-default rate on those loans was roughly 15% to 20%. That's less than half the industry average. "We are very comfortable with what we've been doing," says Franklin Codel, chief financial officer of the bank's home-lending unit. "
We offer a principal reduction if that makes sense for that individual borrower's situation."
Many banks don't want word to get around that they reduce principal. They fear that homeowners who can afford their payments will demand better deals. John Lashley, a 44-year-old salesman in Huntersville, N.C., is making his payments. But he is thinking about walking away from his four-bedroom home unless his lender, Sun Trust Mortgage, agrees to cut the principal on his $345,000 loan. The house next door recently sold for $260,000, and Lashley doesn't see the point of pouring money into his house when he may never recoup the investment he made in 2007. "Why should I stay in my house?" he says. "It's not a moral decision. It's a financial decision."
The conflicting interests of mortgage lenders and home-equity lenders is a big roadblock to doing principal reductions. Banks, credit unions, and thrifts held $951.6 billion in home-equity loans as of Sept. 30, according to Federal Reserve data. Mortgage lenders don't want to cut principal unless the home-equity lenders agree to take a hit. Typically, though, the home-equity lenders are reluctant; much of the value of their loans would be wiped out. That could drive more banks into insolvency, says Joshua Rosner, an analyst at investment research firm Graham Fisher in New York.
The threat of lawsuits is also hampering principal reductions. In December 2008 money manager Greenwich Financial Services sued lender Countrywide Financial in New York State Supreme Court. Greenwich, which owns mortgage-backed securities, demanded 100 cents on the dollar for some Countrywide investments. The securities included loans on which Countrywide had agreed to cut $8.4 billion in principal and interest to settle allegations of predatory lending. Greenwich Financial's case is pending. Bank of America (BAC), which bought Countrywide in 2008, says: "We are confident any attempt to stop this program will be legally unsupportable." Greenwich says it's willing to accept loan changes that benefit borrowers.
So far the feds haven't put pressure on banks to forgive debt. President Barack Obama's $75 billion program to spur banks to alter loan terms doesn't require them to do so. But the FDIC and other regulators are looking at measures to promote the writedowns. Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody's Economy.com (MCO) (who has testified before Congress on housing issues), proposes that banks receive a federal match of $1 for every $2 in principal reductions they offer to homeowners who were victims of predatory lending practices. "You're not going to wipe out all the borrowers' negative equity," he says. "This just gives them enough hope to get them committed again."
With Jody Shenn
Despite encouragement from policymakers, many banks have moved slowly to aid distressed homeowners. When they do modify mortgages, the fixes—such as interest-rate cuts—often are temporary and only put off the day of reckoning.
With another wave of foreclosures looming as payments on risky loans rise and unemployment remains high, it looks as if banks may be forced to resort to a remedy they've been trying to avoid: principal reductions. Banks don't like principal reductions for obvious reasons. But many economists, policymakers, and homeowners see it another way. While interest-rate reductions or extending loan terms do reduce homeowners' monthly payments, they don't give much comfort to borrowers who owe more on their homes than their properties are worth. Borrowers who don't have a stake in their homes are more likely to hand over the keys when they run into trouble. "The evidence is irrefutable," Laurie Goodman, senior managing director of Amherst Securities Group in New York, testified before the U.S. House Financial Services Committee on Dec. 8. "Negative equity is the most important predictor of default."
The 25% plunge in residential real estate prices from their 2006 peak has left homeowners underwater by $745 billion, according to research firm First American CoreLogic—a number that tops the government's $700 billion bailout for banks. That's why Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair is considering incentives for lenders to cut the principal on as much as $45 billion of mortgages acquired from seized banks. "We're looking now at whether we should provide some further loss-sharing for principal writedowns," says Bair.
The foreclosure crisis is likely to deepen this year in part because payments on many adjustable-rate mortgages are set to balloon. Unless there's a sharp recovery in property values or a change in lenders' willingness to cut principal, at least 7 million borrowers currently behind on their payments will lose their homes, estimates Goodman.
RIGHT-SIZING MORTGAGES
Some lenders may be coming around, grudgingly, to the idea of principal reduction. "If you can right-size the mortgage and return to an equity situation, the incentive is to stay," says Micah Green, an attorney at Patton Boggs in Washington, D.C., and a lobbyist for a coalition of mortgage bond investors. Banks can either forgive principal outright or defer it. In deferrals the borrower must pay back the full amount on the original mortgage when he sells the property; if the ultimate sales price doesn't cover the principal, the homeowner has to pay the difference, making it a less effective tool.
A principal deferral helped Marcus Beckett stave off foreclosure. The 42-year-old small-business owner couldn't afford his $2,413 monthly mortgage bill after his income dropped and his son, Riley, was born. In October, OneWest Bank agreed to defer $66,000 of the $423,000 debt on his two-bedroom condominium, which he'll have to pay back if he sells his Aliso Viejo (Calif.) home. The monthly tab on the house he bought in 2006 is now $1,314. "It's like I got a second chance on life," Beckett says. "I feel, mentally, I'm able to keep making payments."
While principal reductions remain rare, banks are doing them more often. In the third quarter of 2009, some 21,000 home loans—3% of the total modified mortgages—included a principal reduction or deferral, according to Mortgage Metrics, a government publication. That's up from 6,245 in the first quarter of 2009, the first time the U.S. reported the data.
Banks that negotiate principal reductions have seen positive results. Last year, Wells Fargo (WFC) cut $2 billion of principal on delinquent loans. After the modifications, the six-month re-default rate on those loans was roughly 15% to 20%. That's less than half the industry average. "We are very comfortable with what we've been doing," says Franklin Codel, chief financial officer of the bank's home-lending unit. "
We offer a principal reduction if that makes sense for that individual borrower's situation."
Many banks don't want word to get around that they reduce principal. They fear that homeowners who can afford their payments will demand better deals. John Lashley, a 44-year-old salesman in Huntersville, N.C., is making his payments. But he is thinking about walking away from his four-bedroom home unless his lender, Sun Trust Mortgage, agrees to cut the principal on his $345,000 loan. The house next door recently sold for $260,000, and Lashley doesn't see the point of pouring money into his house when he may never recoup the investment he made in 2007. "Why should I stay in my house?" he says. "It's not a moral decision. It's a financial decision."
The conflicting interests of mortgage lenders and home-equity lenders is a big roadblock to doing principal reductions. Banks, credit unions, and thrifts held $951.6 billion in home-equity loans as of Sept. 30, according to Federal Reserve data. Mortgage lenders don't want to cut principal unless the home-equity lenders agree to take a hit. Typically, though, the home-equity lenders are reluctant; much of the value of their loans would be wiped out. That could drive more banks into insolvency, says Joshua Rosner, an analyst at investment research firm Graham Fisher in New York.
The threat of lawsuits is also hampering principal reductions. In December 2008 money manager Greenwich Financial Services sued lender Countrywide Financial in New York State Supreme Court. Greenwich, which owns mortgage-backed securities, demanded 100 cents on the dollar for some Countrywide investments. The securities included loans on which Countrywide had agreed to cut $8.4 billion in principal and interest to settle allegations of predatory lending. Greenwich Financial's case is pending. Bank of America (BAC), which bought Countrywide in 2008, says: "We are confident any attempt to stop this program will be legally unsupportable." Greenwich says it's willing to accept loan changes that benefit borrowers.
So far the feds haven't put pressure on banks to forgive debt. President Barack Obama's $75 billion program to spur banks to alter loan terms doesn't require them to do so. But the FDIC and other regulators are looking at measures to promote the writedowns. Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody's Economy.com (MCO) (who has testified before Congress on housing issues), proposes that banks receive a federal match of $1 for every $2 in principal reductions they offer to homeowners who were victims of predatory lending practices. "You're not going to wipe out all the borrowers' negative equity," he says. "This just gives them enough hope to get them committed again."
With Jody Shenn
NY Times: Walk away from your mortgage!
Roger Lowenstein writes for the NY Times about people choosing to voluntarily default on their mortgages when the value of their homes has dropped well below their purchase price. Many people find that they can rent a similar home for much cheaper. Christianity teaches fidelity in contracts - on both sides. However, Lowenstein argues that Wall Street firms are playing the voluntary default game and that they've also been unwilling to lower the loan principal for truly distressed borrowers - perhaps they are getting what they deserve.
John Courson, president and C.E.O. of the Mortgage Bankers Association, recently told The Wall Street Journal that homeowners who default on their mortgages should think about the “message” they will send to “their family and their kids and their friends.” Courson was implying that homeowners — record numbers of whom continue to default — have a responsibility to make good. He wasn’t referring to the people who have no choice, who can’t afford their payments. He was speaking about the rising number of folks who are voluntarily choosing not to pay.
Such voluntary defaults are a new phenomenon. Time was, Americans would do anything to pay their mortgage — forgo a new car or a vacation, even put a younger family member to work. But the housing collapse left 10.7 million families owing more than their homes are worth. So some of them are making a calculated decision to hang onto their money and let their homes go. Is this irresponsible?
Businesses — in particular Wall Street banks — make such calculations routinely. Morgan Stanley recently decided to stop making payments on five San Francisco office buildings. A Morgan Stanley fund purchased the buildings at the height of the boom, and their value has plunged. Nobody has said Morgan Stanley is immoral — perhaps because no one assumed it was moral to begin with. But the average American, as if sprung from some Franklinesque mythology, is supposed to honor his debts, or so says the mortgage industry as well as government officials. Former Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. declared that “any homeowner who can afford his mortgage payment but chooses to walk away from an underwater property is simply a speculator — and one who is not honoring his obligation.” (Paulson presumably was not so censorious of speculation during his 32-year career at Goldman Sachs.)
The moral suasion has continued under President Obama, who has urged that homeowners follow the “responsible” course. Indeed, HUD-approved housing counselors are supposed to counsel people against foreclosure. In many cases, this means counseling people to throw away money. Brent White, a University of Arizona law professor, notes that a family who bought a three-bedroom home in Salinas, Calif., at the market top in 2006, with no down payment (then a common-enough occurrence), could theoretically have to wait 60 years to recover their equity. On the other hand, if they walked, they could rent a similar house for a pittance of their monthly mortgage.
There are two reasons why so-called strategic defaults have been considered antisocial and perhaps amoral. One is that foreclosures depress the neighborhood and drive down prices. But in a market society, since when are people responsible for the economic effects of their actions? Every oil speculator helps to drive up gasoline prices. Every hedge fund that speculated against a bank by purchasing credit-default swaps on its bonds signaled skepticism about the bank’s creditworthiness and helped to make it more costly for the bank to borrow, and thus to issue loans. We are all economic pinballs, insensibly colliding for better or worse.
The other reason is that default (supposedly) debases the character of the borrower. Once, perhaps, when bankers held onto mortgages for 30 years, they occupied a moral high ground. These days, lenders typically unload mortgages within days (or minutes). And not just in mortgage finance, but in virtually every realm of our transaction-obsessed society, the message is that enduring relationships count for less than the value put on assets for sale.
Think of private-equity firms that close a factory — essentially deciding that the company is worth more dead than alive. Or the New York Yankees and their World Series M.V.P. Hideki Matsui, who parted company as soon as the cheering stopped. Or money-losing hedge-fund managers: rather than try to earn back their investors’ lost capital, they start new funds so they can rake in fresh incentives. Sam Zell, a billionaire, let the Tribune Company, which he had previously acquired, file for bankruptcy. Indeed, the owners of any company that defaults on bonds and chooses to let the company fail rather than invest more capital in it are practicing “strategic default.” Banks signal their complicity with this ethos when they send new credit cards to people who failed to stay current on old ones.
Mortgage holders do sign a promissory note, which is a promise to pay. But the contract explicitly details the penalty for nonpayment — surrender of the property. The borrower isn’t escaping the consequences; he is suffering them.
In some states, lenders also have recourse to the borrowers’ unmortgaged assets, like their car and savings accounts. A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond found that defaults are lower in such states, apparently because lenders threaten the borrowers with judgments against their assets. But actual lawsuits are rare.
And given that nearly a quarter of mortgages are underwater, and that 10 percent of mortgages are delinquent, White, of the University of Arizona, is surprised that more people haven’t walked. He thinks the desire to avoid shame is a factor, as are overblown fears of harm to credit ratings. Probably, homeowners also labor under a delusion that their homes will quickly return to value. White has argued that the government should stop perpetuating default “scare stories” and, indeed, should encourage borrowers to default when it’s in their economic interest. This would correct a prevailing imbalance: homeowners operate under a “powerful moral constraint” while lenders are busily trying to maximize profits. More important, it might get the system unstuck. If lenders feared an avalanche of strategic defaults, they would have an incentive to renegotiate loan terms. In theory, this could produce a wave of loan modifications — the very goal the Treasury has been pursuing to end the crisis.
No one says defaulting on a contract is pretty or that, in a perfectly functioning society, defaults would be the rule. But to put the onus for restraint on ordinary homeowners seems rather strange. If the Mortgage Bankers Association is against defaults, its members, presumably the experts in such matters, might take better care not to lend people more than their homes are worth.
Roger Lowenstein, an outside director of the Sequoia Fund, is a contributing writer for the magazine. His book “The End of Wall Street” is coming out in April.
This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:
Correction: January 10, 2010
An essay on Page 15 this weekend about underwater mortgages misstates the parties who believe their homes will go up in value quickly. It is the homeowners — not the “mortgagees,” who issue mortgages.
John Courson, president and C.E.O. of the Mortgage Bankers Association, recently told The Wall Street Journal that homeowners who default on their mortgages should think about the “message” they will send to “their family and their kids and their friends.” Courson was implying that homeowners — record numbers of whom continue to default — have a responsibility to make good. He wasn’t referring to the people who have no choice, who can’t afford their payments. He was speaking about the rising number of folks who are voluntarily choosing not to pay.
Such voluntary defaults are a new phenomenon. Time was, Americans would do anything to pay their mortgage — forgo a new car or a vacation, even put a younger family member to work. But the housing collapse left 10.7 million families owing more than their homes are worth. So some of them are making a calculated decision to hang onto their money and let their homes go. Is this irresponsible?
Businesses — in particular Wall Street banks — make such calculations routinely. Morgan Stanley recently decided to stop making payments on five San Francisco office buildings. A Morgan Stanley fund purchased the buildings at the height of the boom, and their value has plunged. Nobody has said Morgan Stanley is immoral — perhaps because no one assumed it was moral to begin with. But the average American, as if sprung from some Franklinesque mythology, is supposed to honor his debts, or so says the mortgage industry as well as government officials. Former Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. declared that “any homeowner who can afford his mortgage payment but chooses to walk away from an underwater property is simply a speculator — and one who is not honoring his obligation.” (Paulson presumably was not so censorious of speculation during his 32-year career at Goldman Sachs.)
The moral suasion has continued under President Obama, who has urged that homeowners follow the “responsible” course. Indeed, HUD-approved housing counselors are supposed to counsel people against foreclosure. In many cases, this means counseling people to throw away money. Brent White, a University of Arizona law professor, notes that a family who bought a three-bedroom home in Salinas, Calif., at the market top in 2006, with no down payment (then a common-enough occurrence), could theoretically have to wait 60 years to recover their equity. On the other hand, if they walked, they could rent a similar house for a pittance of their monthly mortgage.
There are two reasons why so-called strategic defaults have been considered antisocial and perhaps amoral. One is that foreclosures depress the neighborhood and drive down prices. But in a market society, since when are people responsible for the economic effects of their actions? Every oil speculator helps to drive up gasoline prices. Every hedge fund that speculated against a bank by purchasing credit-default swaps on its bonds signaled skepticism about the bank’s creditworthiness and helped to make it more costly for the bank to borrow, and thus to issue loans. We are all economic pinballs, insensibly colliding for better or worse.
The other reason is that default (supposedly) debases the character of the borrower. Once, perhaps, when bankers held onto mortgages for 30 years, they occupied a moral high ground. These days, lenders typically unload mortgages within days (or minutes). And not just in mortgage finance, but in virtually every realm of our transaction-obsessed society, the message is that enduring relationships count for less than the value put on assets for sale.
Think of private-equity firms that close a factory — essentially deciding that the company is worth more dead than alive. Or the New York Yankees and their World Series M.V.P. Hideki Matsui, who parted company as soon as the cheering stopped. Or money-losing hedge-fund managers: rather than try to earn back their investors’ lost capital, they start new funds so they can rake in fresh incentives. Sam Zell, a billionaire, let the Tribune Company, which he had previously acquired, file for bankruptcy. Indeed, the owners of any company that defaults on bonds and chooses to let the company fail rather than invest more capital in it are practicing “strategic default.” Banks signal their complicity with this ethos when they send new credit cards to people who failed to stay current on old ones.
Mortgage holders do sign a promissory note, which is a promise to pay. But the contract explicitly details the penalty for nonpayment — surrender of the property. The borrower isn’t escaping the consequences; he is suffering them.
In some states, lenders also have recourse to the borrowers’ unmortgaged assets, like their car and savings accounts. A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond found that defaults are lower in such states, apparently because lenders threaten the borrowers with judgments against their assets. But actual lawsuits are rare.
And given that nearly a quarter of mortgages are underwater, and that 10 percent of mortgages are delinquent, White, of the University of Arizona, is surprised that more people haven’t walked. He thinks the desire to avoid shame is a factor, as are overblown fears of harm to credit ratings. Probably, homeowners also labor under a delusion that their homes will quickly return to value. White has argued that the government should stop perpetuating default “scare stories” and, indeed, should encourage borrowers to default when it’s in their economic interest. This would correct a prevailing imbalance: homeowners operate under a “powerful moral constraint” while lenders are busily trying to maximize profits. More important, it might get the system unstuck. If lenders feared an avalanche of strategic defaults, they would have an incentive to renegotiate loan terms. In theory, this could produce a wave of loan modifications — the very goal the Treasury has been pursuing to end the crisis.
No one says defaulting on a contract is pretty or that, in a perfectly functioning society, defaults would be the rule. But to put the onus for restraint on ordinary homeowners seems rather strange. If the Mortgage Bankers Association is against defaults, its members, presumably the experts in such matters, might take better care not to lend people more than their homes are worth.
Roger Lowenstein, an outside director of the Sequoia Fund, is a contributing writer for the magazine. His book “The End of Wall Street” is coming out in April.
This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:
Correction: January 10, 2010
An essay on Page 15 this weekend about underwater mortgages misstates the parties who believe their homes will go up in value quickly. It is the homeowners — not the “mortgagees,” who issue mortgages.
NY Times: Guantanamo Reunion, by way of BBC
Brian Stelter writes about reconciliation.
New to Facebook, Brandon Neely was searching the site for acquaintances in 2008 when he typed in the names of some of the detainees he had guarded during his tenure as a prison guard at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
Mr. Neely, an Army veteran who spent six months at the prison in 2002, sent messages to one of the freed men, Shafiq Rasul, and was astonished when Mr. Rasul replied. Their exchanges sparked a face-to-face meeting, arranged by the BBC, which will be shown on Tuesday. Mr. Neely, who has served as the president of the Houston chapter of Iraq Veterans Against the War, says his time at Guantánamo now haunts him, and has granted confessional-style interviews about the abuses he says he witnessed there. In a message to Mr. Rasul, Mr. Neely apologized for his role in the imprisonment.
Gavin Lee, a BBC correspondent, learned about the Facebook messages from Mr. Rasul, who lives in Britain, and thought the situation was incredible. Mr. Lee tracked down Mr. Neely — on Facebook, naturally — and asked, “would you consider meeting face to face?”
“He thought about it and he said, ‘I would love to,’ ” Mr. Lee recalled last week. “I would love to apologize in person.”
It took months to find a time, however, and Mr. Rasul was uncertain. He told the BBC that some members of his family had said to him, “Why do you want to meet someone like that for? The way he treated you, you stay away from him.”
The BBC paid for Mr. Neely’s flight to London last month, where a camera crew filmed him meeting Mr. Rasul and a second former detainee, Ruhal Ahmed, on a Saturday afternoon. (Both men have pursued legal action against former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.)
The cameras were there for a second conversation the morning before Mr. Neely’s flight home to Houston. “To see it happen was extraordinary,” Mr. Lee said.
In a segment that will be telecast on Tuesday’s “BBC World News America,” Mr. Ahmed is shown saying to Mr. Neely, “You look different without your cap.”
“You look different in jumpsuits,” Mr. Neely responds. BRIAN STELTER
New to Facebook, Brandon Neely was searching the site for acquaintances in 2008 when he typed in the names of some of the detainees he had guarded during his tenure as a prison guard at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
Mr. Neely, an Army veteran who spent six months at the prison in 2002, sent messages to one of the freed men, Shafiq Rasul, and was astonished when Mr. Rasul replied. Their exchanges sparked a face-to-face meeting, arranged by the BBC, which will be shown on Tuesday. Mr. Neely, who has served as the president of the Houston chapter of Iraq Veterans Against the War, says his time at Guantánamo now haunts him, and has granted confessional-style interviews about the abuses he says he witnessed there. In a message to Mr. Rasul, Mr. Neely apologized for his role in the imprisonment.
Gavin Lee, a BBC correspondent, learned about the Facebook messages from Mr. Rasul, who lives in Britain, and thought the situation was incredible. Mr. Lee tracked down Mr. Neely — on Facebook, naturally — and asked, “would you consider meeting face to face?”
“He thought about it and he said, ‘I would love to,’ ” Mr. Lee recalled last week. “I would love to apologize in person.”
It took months to find a time, however, and Mr. Rasul was uncertain. He told the BBC that some members of his family had said to him, “Why do you want to meet someone like that for? The way he treated you, you stay away from him.”
The BBC paid for Mr. Neely’s flight to London last month, where a camera crew filmed him meeting Mr. Rasul and a second former detainee, Ruhal Ahmed, on a Saturday afternoon. (Both men have pursued legal action against former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.)
The cameras were there for a second conversation the morning before Mr. Neely’s flight home to Houston. “To see it happen was extraordinary,” Mr. Lee said.
In a segment that will be telecast on Tuesday’s “BBC World News America,” Mr. Ahmed is shown saying to Mr. Neely, “You look different without your cap.”
“You look different in jumpsuits,” Mr. Neely responds. BRIAN STELTER
Monday, January 11, 2010
Antiwar.com: In Defense of Avatar - Do savages have rights?
Not that I've watched the movie, but some conservatives seem to have condemned the movie based on its perceived bias towards socialism. David Henderson, a libertarian, argues that in fact the movie upholds property rights - in this case the property rights of the fictitious alien race being invaded. Henderson doesn't use this term, but some would classify this case of property rights as Indigenous people's rights.
Some writers who are generally my allies in favor of capitalism and free markets have been critical of the movie Avatar. Reihan Salam, for example, on Forbes.com, writes, "In a sense, capitalism is the villain of Avatar." Edward Hudgins, a fan of Ayn Rand, as am I, writes that Avatar is "loaded with tired, mind-numbing leftist clichés."
But I don’t think Avatar is an attack on capitalism. One could leave the movie and have no idea, based on just the movie, about James Cameron’s view of capitalism. And while it did have some clichés (most movies do), I didn’t find it loaded. So what is Avatar? In fact, Avatar is a powerful antiwar movie – and a defense of property rights. For that reason, I found it easy to identify with those whose way of life was being destroyed by military might. (Warning: slight spoilers ahead.)
Consider one of Salam’s main arguments against Avatar. He points out, correctly, that the tremendous economic growth that relatively free markets have led to in the last two centuries is responsible for the fact that humans have grown taller, stronger, and healthier. The Na’vi, by contrast, even without clearly visible means of support, "do seem pretty tall, strong, healthy, and well-fed." Point taken. But do we really look for realism in a movie that’s about people on a fictitious planet? I found many things implausible about the movie – start with the fact that people who are obviously American go to another planet and find people who speak English better than most Americans do. Surely, then, the size of the humanoids’ bodies is one of the least important implausibilities.
Ed Hudgins criticizes the movie on the grounds that Pandora, the alien planet, is a "Garden of Eden or lost paradise inhabited by noble savages." This myth, he writes, "has done no end of harm to humanity." I agree with him, both about how Pandora is portrayed and about how much harm the myth of the noble savage has done.
But here’s the crucial question, a question that neither Salam nor Hudgins addresses: Do savages, noble or otherwise, have rights?
If given a choice between high-tech, with all its creature comforts, and the jungle life of Tarzan, I, like Salam and Hudgins, will take high-tech every time. But that’s not what the movie’s about. It’s about people from a high-tech civilization using technology to make war on people from a more primitive society so that they can steal their stuff. That’s a very different choice. I would choose not to kill them and take their property. What would Salam or Hudgins choose? They don’t make their answers clear, although they show zero sympathy for the victims of the attack.
In fact, the defense of property rights in Avatar is so clear that, at one point in the movie, when the bad guys are justifying their war on the grounds that they need "Unobtainium," I turned to a libertarian friend and said, "This is the Kelo decision." Recall that the Supreme Court, in Kelo v. City of New London, decided that it was all right to take Suzette Kelo’s property from its low-tech use as a house so that a major corporation could use it for a "grander" project.
Which brings me back to whether this movie was an attack on capitalism. I think not. To the extent that it makes any statement about capitalism, Avatar is a defense of capitalism. Capitalism is based on property rights and voluntary exchange. The Na’vi had property rights in the crucial tree and various other properties surrounding it. Did they own it as individuals or as community tribal property? We can’t be sure, but probably the latter. They had refused to sell the property to the outsiders. There was nothing the outsiders could give them that would make it worth their while. What should we, if we are good capitalists, conclude? That, just as in the Kelo case, the people currently sitting on the land value it more than the outsiders. The land is already in its highest-valued use. Hudgins and Salam could argue that that’s implausible. Surely there would be some finite price that the Na’vi would take in return for the Unobtainium. Maybe, maybe not. But once the Na’vi have made it clear that they’re unwilling to exchange it, that should be the end of things, shouldn’t it?
And here’s the irony: no one understands that better than Ed Hudgins. Here are his eloquent words following the disastrous Kelo decision:
"This [taking property forcibly from some to give to others] is the philosophy that informs the paternalist political elites of New London and elsewhere. They see themselves as a new ruling elite who manifest the will of the people. ‘L’état, c’est moi!’ These planners either put the good of an abstract collective – the city – ahead of the rights of the individuals who make it up, or they abrogate the rights of some individuals in order to give the undeserved and the unearned to another group of individuals in the name of survival and ‘economic development.’"
Now, Hudgins could argue that the analogy with the Kelo decision doesn’t make sense because this is tribal property, not individual property. OK. So imagine that some civilization more technologically advanced than ours discovers that there’s a rare mineral below the hills and mountains of Yosemite, which, in a sense, is tribal property. Our government has refused to sell. To get at the mineral, this other "civilization" must blast and bulldoze Yosemite down to nothing. If that more advanced group comes in and uses violence to grab Yosemite, would Hudgins say that was fine? I think not.
And here’s the other irony. Hudgins already understands all this. Hudgins argues, quite credibly, that in Avatar, the private company Resources Development Administration is a stand-in for Halliburton and the private army represents Blackwater, and so what we have is "the evil military-industrial complex." In other words, Hudgins recognizes that there are entities in the real world that are much like the bad guys in Avatar. The crucial question for him is: Whose side are you on?
Hudgins argues that James Cameron is claiming, "That’s capitalism for you." As noted earlier, it’s not clear that Cameron is so arguing. But if that’s what Cameron believes, shouldn’t Hudgins’s response be, "No, that’s corporatism for you." In another excellent piece on Kelo, aptly titled "One Giant Leap Toward Fascist America," Hudgins writes:
"The U.S. Supreme Court is allowing a local government to kick out of the house in which she was born 87-year-old Wilhelmina Dery and her husband, who has lived there with her for 60 years. Why? Because the government wants to seize their property, bulldoze theirs and many other houses, and to sell the land to other businesses and developers for private uses. While one must take great care in choosing words in political discussions, one must not mince them either. This decision in the Kelo vs. New London case is another giant step towards classical corporatism or fascism in America."
He’s right. Hudgins tugs our heart strings by noting that Wilhelmina Dery had lived in her house for 87 years. That’s kind of like the Na’vi getting attached to a tree, don’t you think? It’s entirely appropriate for Hudgins to appeal to our sympathy, just as it’s entirely appropriate for James Cameron to do the same. Read through everything Hudgins has written on Kelo and you won’t find a wisp of discussion about how low-tech or high-tech, savage or civilized, Mrs. Dery is. And that’s because it doesn’t matter. People in high-tech societies have rights. So do savages. It would be nice if Hudgins showed even one tenth of the concern for the "savages" over whom the "non-savages" of the U.S. military and CIA roll as he shows for an old woman who lives (or used to live) in a house.
One other thing that makes me doubt that Avatar is an attack on capitalism is the music that’s played when the high-tech army advances on Pandora. It sounds as if it’s straight from the Soviet Union’s now-defunct Red Army.
Avatar is an eloquent defense of the right of people in other civilizations to live as they please. As I mentioned, Hudgins is a fan of Ayn Rand and, in fact, makes his living advocating her ideas. So I’ll put it in terms that Ayn Rand used. On the issue of Avatar, Hudgins is "concrete-bound." He fails to see the basic principle: people’s right to live their lives in peace.
Some writers who are generally my allies in favor of capitalism and free markets have been critical of the movie Avatar. Reihan Salam, for example, on Forbes.com, writes, "In a sense, capitalism is the villain of Avatar." Edward Hudgins, a fan of Ayn Rand, as am I, writes that Avatar is "loaded with tired, mind-numbing leftist clichés."
But I don’t think Avatar is an attack on capitalism. One could leave the movie and have no idea, based on just the movie, about James Cameron’s view of capitalism. And while it did have some clichés (most movies do), I didn’t find it loaded. So what is Avatar? In fact, Avatar is a powerful antiwar movie – and a defense of property rights. For that reason, I found it easy to identify with those whose way of life was being destroyed by military might. (Warning: slight spoilers ahead.)
Consider one of Salam’s main arguments against Avatar. He points out, correctly, that the tremendous economic growth that relatively free markets have led to in the last two centuries is responsible for the fact that humans have grown taller, stronger, and healthier. The Na’vi, by contrast, even without clearly visible means of support, "do seem pretty tall, strong, healthy, and well-fed." Point taken. But do we really look for realism in a movie that’s about people on a fictitious planet? I found many things implausible about the movie – start with the fact that people who are obviously American go to another planet and find people who speak English better than most Americans do. Surely, then, the size of the humanoids’ bodies is one of the least important implausibilities.
Ed Hudgins criticizes the movie on the grounds that Pandora, the alien planet, is a "Garden of Eden or lost paradise inhabited by noble savages." This myth, he writes, "has done no end of harm to humanity." I agree with him, both about how Pandora is portrayed and about how much harm the myth of the noble savage has done.
But here’s the crucial question, a question that neither Salam nor Hudgins addresses: Do savages, noble or otherwise, have rights?
If given a choice between high-tech, with all its creature comforts, and the jungle life of Tarzan, I, like Salam and Hudgins, will take high-tech every time. But that’s not what the movie’s about. It’s about people from a high-tech civilization using technology to make war on people from a more primitive society so that they can steal their stuff. That’s a very different choice. I would choose not to kill them and take their property. What would Salam or Hudgins choose? They don’t make their answers clear, although they show zero sympathy for the victims of the attack.
In fact, the defense of property rights in Avatar is so clear that, at one point in the movie, when the bad guys are justifying their war on the grounds that they need "Unobtainium," I turned to a libertarian friend and said, "This is the Kelo decision." Recall that the Supreme Court, in Kelo v. City of New London, decided that it was all right to take Suzette Kelo’s property from its low-tech use as a house so that a major corporation could use it for a "grander" project.
Which brings me back to whether this movie was an attack on capitalism. I think not. To the extent that it makes any statement about capitalism, Avatar is a defense of capitalism. Capitalism is based on property rights and voluntary exchange. The Na’vi had property rights in the crucial tree and various other properties surrounding it. Did they own it as individuals or as community tribal property? We can’t be sure, but probably the latter. They had refused to sell the property to the outsiders. There was nothing the outsiders could give them that would make it worth their while. What should we, if we are good capitalists, conclude? That, just as in the Kelo case, the people currently sitting on the land value it more than the outsiders. The land is already in its highest-valued use. Hudgins and Salam could argue that that’s implausible. Surely there would be some finite price that the Na’vi would take in return for the Unobtainium. Maybe, maybe not. But once the Na’vi have made it clear that they’re unwilling to exchange it, that should be the end of things, shouldn’t it?
And here’s the irony: no one understands that better than Ed Hudgins. Here are his eloquent words following the disastrous Kelo decision:
"This [taking property forcibly from some to give to others] is the philosophy that informs the paternalist political elites of New London and elsewhere. They see themselves as a new ruling elite who manifest the will of the people. ‘L’état, c’est moi!’ These planners either put the good of an abstract collective – the city – ahead of the rights of the individuals who make it up, or they abrogate the rights of some individuals in order to give the undeserved and the unearned to another group of individuals in the name of survival and ‘economic development.’"
Now, Hudgins could argue that the analogy with the Kelo decision doesn’t make sense because this is tribal property, not individual property. OK. So imagine that some civilization more technologically advanced than ours discovers that there’s a rare mineral below the hills and mountains of Yosemite, which, in a sense, is tribal property. Our government has refused to sell. To get at the mineral, this other "civilization" must blast and bulldoze Yosemite down to nothing. If that more advanced group comes in and uses violence to grab Yosemite, would Hudgins say that was fine? I think not.
And here’s the other irony. Hudgins already understands all this. Hudgins argues, quite credibly, that in Avatar, the private company Resources Development Administration is a stand-in for Halliburton and the private army represents Blackwater, and so what we have is "the evil military-industrial complex." In other words, Hudgins recognizes that there are entities in the real world that are much like the bad guys in Avatar. The crucial question for him is: Whose side are you on?
Hudgins argues that James Cameron is claiming, "That’s capitalism for you." As noted earlier, it’s not clear that Cameron is so arguing. But if that’s what Cameron believes, shouldn’t Hudgins’s response be, "No, that’s corporatism for you." In another excellent piece on Kelo, aptly titled "One Giant Leap Toward Fascist America," Hudgins writes:
"The U.S. Supreme Court is allowing a local government to kick out of the house in which she was born 87-year-old Wilhelmina Dery and her husband, who has lived there with her for 60 years. Why? Because the government wants to seize their property, bulldoze theirs and many other houses, and to sell the land to other businesses and developers for private uses. While one must take great care in choosing words in political discussions, one must not mince them either. This decision in the Kelo vs. New London case is another giant step towards classical corporatism or fascism in America."
He’s right. Hudgins tugs our heart strings by noting that Wilhelmina Dery had lived in her house for 87 years. That’s kind of like the Na’vi getting attached to a tree, don’t you think? It’s entirely appropriate for Hudgins to appeal to our sympathy, just as it’s entirely appropriate for James Cameron to do the same. Read through everything Hudgins has written on Kelo and you won’t find a wisp of discussion about how low-tech or high-tech, savage or civilized, Mrs. Dery is. And that’s because it doesn’t matter. People in high-tech societies have rights. So do savages. It would be nice if Hudgins showed even one tenth of the concern for the "savages" over whom the "non-savages" of the U.S. military and CIA roll as he shows for an old woman who lives (or used to live) in a house.
One other thing that makes me doubt that Avatar is an attack on capitalism is the music that’s played when the high-tech army advances on Pandora. It sounds as if it’s straight from the Soviet Union’s now-defunct Red Army.
Avatar is an eloquent defense of the right of people in other civilizations to live as they please. As I mentioned, Hudgins is a fan of Ayn Rand and, in fact, makes his living advocating her ideas. So I’ll put it in terms that Ayn Rand used. On the issue of Avatar, Hudgins is "concrete-bound." He fails to see the basic principle: people’s right to live their lives in peace.
Sunday, January 10, 2010
Washington Post: Mick Huckabee - Why I Commuted Maurice Clemmons' Sentence
A few months ago, Maurice Clemmons killed four police officers before himself being killed. He had many previous violent felony convictions. However, in his youth, he was pardoned by Mick Huckabee, then Governor of Arkansas.
Many have said that this will kill Huckabee's chances if he runs for President. Not that I would vote for the man, but this is unfortunate. The U.S. criminal justice system needs more pardons and commutations, not fewer - the folks who falsely think that just getting tough on crime will stop it will use this as ammunition. Now, it may well be the case that then-Gov. Huckabee and his staff were sloppy in researching offenders' backgrounds, as Debra Saunders writes for SFGate. However, the tough on crime crowd will say this proves that nobody should be pardoned - and they are wrong. Our focus should be on how to reduce crime generally, how to better improve the system so that we are really segregating the truly violent offenders, how to rehabilitate those who can be rehabilitated, how to ease re-entry into society and how to target the offenders who are truly rehabilitated for pardons.
Anyway, in an article for the Washington Post, Huckabee explains why he pardoned Clemmons:
The nation was stunned by the senseless and savage cold-blooded murders of four young police officers in Lakewood, Wash., over the Thanksgiving holiday weekend. Whenever a police officer or soldier is killed, the loss is even more profound, for they are the ones who stand between our way of life and total anarchy.
Nine years ago, the name Maurice Clemmons crossed my desk. I commuted his sentence from 108 years to 47 years. I take full responsibility for my actions of nine years ago. I acted on the facts presented to me in 2000. If I could have possibly known what Clemmons would do nine years later, I obviously would have made a different decision. If I only had the same information I had then, I would make the same decision.
Each state is different, but in Arkansas, a governor doesn't initiate a parole -- the Post Prison Transfer Board (PPTB) does so after it conducts a thorough review of an inmate's file and request. The board then makes a recommendation to the governor, who decides to grant or deny it.
If the decision is made to grant any form of clemency (the broad term for a commutation or a full pardon), the governor gives notice of intent, and the file is sent to the prosecutor, judge, law enforcement officials, the attorney general and the secretary of state, as well as to the news media. A period of 30 days is allotted for these officials and the public to weigh in, at which point the final decision is rendered.
Despite news reports, no objections were raised during the 30-day response period for this case. In fact, only letters of support for Clemmons' commutation were received, including one from the circuit judge.
Between 1,000 and 1,200 requests for some form of clemency came to my desk each and every year of the 10 and a half years I was governor. An overwhelming majority of the time, I denied the requests. When I did grant them, it was based on the recommendations of all five of the members of the PPTB, with consideration given to input from public officials and my own personal review of each and every file.
Maurice Clemmons was 16 years old when he committed the crimes of burglary and robbery. He was sentenced to a total of 108 years in prison, dramatically outside the norm for sentencing for the crimes he committed and the age at which he committed them.
In 2000, the PPTB unanimously recommended that his sentence be commuted after he had already served 11 years in prison. As per the recommendation, I commuted his sentence to the term of 47 years (still a long sentence in comparison to others for the type of crime he had committed), making him parole eligible. It did not parole him, as governors do not have that power in Arkansas. He would have to separately apply for parole and meet the criteria for it.
Three months after the commutation, Clemmons met the criteria for parole and was paroled to supervision in late 2000. When he violated the terms of his parole, he was returned to prison and should have remained behind bars. For reasons only the prosecutor can explain, he ended up dropping the charges, allowing Clemmons to leave prison and return to supervised parole.
Clemmons moved to his native Washington State and engaged in intermittent criminal activity that increased in violence and frequency. He was arrested on charges of raping a child, yet was allowed to post bail in Washington. While out on bail, he committed the unspeakable acts of murdering four valiant police officers.
I can't explain why he wasn't prosecuted properly for the parole violations, or why he was allowed to make bail in Washington and was not incarcerated earlier for crimes committed there. I take responsibility for my actions, but not for the actions of others, nor for the misinformed words of commentators.
The two professions I value most in our society are soldiers and police officers, with firemen and schoolteachers right behind. The death of the four officers in Lakewood should never have happened. I wish Maurice Clemmons' file had never crossed my desk. But it did. The decision I made is one I now wish could have been made with a view into the future. That decision would have been different.
None of this is of any comfort to the families of these police officers, nor should it be. Their loss is senseless. No words or deeds by anyone will bring them back to their loved ones. Our system is not perfect, and neither are those responsible for administering it. The system and those of us who are supposed to make sure it works sometimes get it wrong. In this case, we clearly did.
Mike Huckabee was governor of Arkansas from 1996 to 2007.
Many have said that this will kill Huckabee's chances if he runs for President. Not that I would vote for the man, but this is unfortunate. The U.S. criminal justice system needs more pardons and commutations, not fewer - the folks who falsely think that just getting tough on crime will stop it will use this as ammunition. Now, it may well be the case that then-Gov. Huckabee and his staff were sloppy in researching offenders' backgrounds, as Debra Saunders writes for SFGate. However, the tough on crime crowd will say this proves that nobody should be pardoned - and they are wrong. Our focus should be on how to reduce crime generally, how to better improve the system so that we are really segregating the truly violent offenders, how to rehabilitate those who can be rehabilitated, how to ease re-entry into society and how to target the offenders who are truly rehabilitated for pardons.
Anyway, in an article for the Washington Post, Huckabee explains why he pardoned Clemmons:
The nation was stunned by the senseless and savage cold-blooded murders of four young police officers in Lakewood, Wash., over the Thanksgiving holiday weekend. Whenever a police officer or soldier is killed, the loss is even more profound, for they are the ones who stand between our way of life and total anarchy.
Nine years ago, the name Maurice Clemmons crossed my desk. I commuted his sentence from 108 years to 47 years. I take full responsibility for my actions of nine years ago. I acted on the facts presented to me in 2000. If I could have possibly known what Clemmons would do nine years later, I obviously would have made a different decision. If I only had the same information I had then, I would make the same decision.
Each state is different, but in Arkansas, a governor doesn't initiate a parole -- the Post Prison Transfer Board (PPTB) does so after it conducts a thorough review of an inmate's file and request. The board then makes a recommendation to the governor, who decides to grant or deny it.
If the decision is made to grant any form of clemency (the broad term for a commutation or a full pardon), the governor gives notice of intent, and the file is sent to the prosecutor, judge, law enforcement officials, the attorney general and the secretary of state, as well as to the news media. A period of 30 days is allotted for these officials and the public to weigh in, at which point the final decision is rendered.
Despite news reports, no objections were raised during the 30-day response period for this case. In fact, only letters of support for Clemmons' commutation were received, including one from the circuit judge.
Between 1,000 and 1,200 requests for some form of clemency came to my desk each and every year of the 10 and a half years I was governor. An overwhelming majority of the time, I denied the requests. When I did grant them, it was based on the recommendations of all five of the members of the PPTB, with consideration given to input from public officials and my own personal review of each and every file.
Maurice Clemmons was 16 years old when he committed the crimes of burglary and robbery. He was sentenced to a total of 108 years in prison, dramatically outside the norm for sentencing for the crimes he committed and the age at which he committed them.
In 2000, the PPTB unanimously recommended that his sentence be commuted after he had already served 11 years in prison. As per the recommendation, I commuted his sentence to the term of 47 years (still a long sentence in comparison to others for the type of crime he had committed), making him parole eligible. It did not parole him, as governors do not have that power in Arkansas. He would have to separately apply for parole and meet the criteria for it.
Three months after the commutation, Clemmons met the criteria for parole and was paroled to supervision in late 2000. When he violated the terms of his parole, he was returned to prison and should have remained behind bars. For reasons only the prosecutor can explain, he ended up dropping the charges, allowing Clemmons to leave prison and return to supervised parole.
Clemmons moved to his native Washington State and engaged in intermittent criminal activity that increased in violence and frequency. He was arrested on charges of raping a child, yet was allowed to post bail in Washington. While out on bail, he committed the unspeakable acts of murdering four valiant police officers.
I can't explain why he wasn't prosecuted properly for the parole violations, or why he was allowed to make bail in Washington and was not incarcerated earlier for crimes committed there. I take responsibility for my actions, but not for the actions of others, nor for the misinformed words of commentators.
The two professions I value most in our society are soldiers and police officers, with firemen and schoolteachers right behind. The death of the four officers in Lakewood should never have happened. I wish Maurice Clemmons' file had never crossed my desk. But it did. The decision I made is one I now wish could have been made with a view into the future. That decision would have been different.
None of this is of any comfort to the families of these police officers, nor should it be. Their loss is senseless. No words or deeds by anyone will bring them back to their loved ones. Our system is not perfect, and neither are those responsible for administering it. The system and those of us who are supposed to make sure it works sometimes get it wrong. In this case, we clearly did.
Mike Huckabee was governor of Arkansas from 1996 to 2007.
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